Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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Douglas R. Hofstadter on Prisoner’s Dilemma - Dictionary of Arguments
II 781 Prisoner's Dilemma: (1950 by Melvin Dresher and Merrill Flood of Rand Corporation). Classical form: two prisoners are interrogated separately. Problem: Logic prevents cooperation. The assumption about the behavior of the other leads one to do something worse than would be good for both, but the security is missing. Example variants that make the idea easier: A one-time deal with someone you never see again, depositing money bags in the forest, everyone will try to cheat after realizing that the other (unknown) will try the same thing. The psychological idea of the personal acquaintance of the two prisoners obscures the problem. Example' The business with the deposited money can be repeated, repeated prisoner dilemma: There is no generally best strategy here. Prisoner's Dilemma: Implications: Question: Can there be cooperation in a world of egoists? How can it emerge at all, can cooperation strategies survive better? Can cooperation emerge from non-cooperation? II 784 Robert Axelrod: 1979: organised a telex tournament in which different strategies of the repeat prisoner dilemma were to compete against each other. Winner: the program "Tit for Tat" by Anatol Rapoport: "Cooperate in the first round, then do everything the other player did during the previous move". >R. Axelrod. This program won over and over again, even on repetitions of the competition. However, the optimum is only a stalemate. Nobody can win! The program forces the other to behave in a way that makes them both perform well. II 789 Strategy: Echo effects should be minimized. An intelligent analysis must go at least three steps further. In the reaction to exit actions of the opposite side, one can repeat or even expand one's own previous strategy. Repetitive Prisoner's Dilemma: if you can't influence the other at all, you should drop out in the first round! Strictly speaking, this means that if you visit a garage on a long journey, the work most likely will not be done. II 797 Cooperation: In a world of egoists, mutual cooperation may well arise without central control, provided that there is only one group of individuals who rely on reciprocity. II 801 For example, someone auctions a dollar bill for 3.40! This was the result of a rule of the game (which the participants understood too late), according to which the highest bidder received the dollar bill, but the second had to pay the last amount he had bid._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Hofstadter I Douglas Hofstadter Gödel, Escher, Bach: An Eternal Golden Braid German Edition: Gödel, Escher, Bach - ein Endloses Geflochtenes Band Stuttgart 2017 Hofstadter II Douglas Hofstadter Metamagical Themas: Questing for the Essence of Mind and Pattern German Edition: Metamagicum München 1994 |
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> Counter arguments against Hofstadter
> Counter arguments in relation to Prisoner’s Dilemma
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-29